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I. OVERVIEW
And what happens to individual freedom and
equality – and to our very conception of law itself – when the
criminal code comes to cover so many facets of daily life that
prosecutors can almost choose their targets with impunity?1
In the United States, most state and local prosecutors
are elected officials 2 who have a vested interest in the
outcome of a case. Secondly, a prosecutor’s decisions are
largely made in secret and reviewed by no one. 3 Thirdly,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s powerful statement
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that the United States Attorney’s interest in a criminal
prosecution is not that he “shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done”, 4 which is reflected in the American Bar
Association’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 5
“the vagueness of this standard and the prosecutor’s
unfettered discretion permit her to define justice as she sees
fit, and many equate justice with convictions and
incarceration, regardless of the circumstances of the case.”6
Lafave has explained the nature of the American
prosecutor’s discretion.
One of the most striking features of the
American system of criminal justice is the
broad range of largely uncontrolled discretion
exercised by the prosecutor. Particularly
noteworthy are these kinds of discretionary
decisions: (1) the decision not to prosecute an
individual
notwithstanding
sufficient
evidence to meet the legal requirements for
commencing a prosecution; and (2) the
decision to tender concessions to a charged
individual on the condition that he plead
guilty rather than stand trial.7
Davis has commented to similar effect.
Prosecutors are the most powerful
officials in the American criminal justice
system. They control the direction and
outcome of all criminal cases, particularly
through their charging and plea-bargaining
decisions. These decisions have greater impact
and more serious consequences than those of
any other criminal justice official. The
prosecutor’s charging and plea-bargaining
decisions are totally discretionary and
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
ABA MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 7-13 (AM. BARR ASS’N 1980) ‘The
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate;
his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.’
6 Angela J. Davis, The Power and Discretion of the American Prosecutor,
49 DROIT ET CULTURES 55, 60 ¶ 17 (2005).
7 Wayne R. Lafave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in The United States, 18
THE AM. J. OF COMPAR. L., 532, 532 (1970).
4
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virtually unreviewable. Although most
American prosecutors are elected officials, the
democratic process does not effectively serve
as a check on prosecutorial power because the
charging and plea-bargaining decisions are
made behind closed doors, shielded from
public view.8

The outcome has been succinctly summarised by
Pfaff: “Nearly everyone in prison ended up there by signing
a piece of paper in a dingy conference room in a county office
building.”9
An alternative perspective to the unfettered power of
the American prosecutor has been provided by Bellin, who
considers the widespread view that American prosecutors
rule the criminal justice system to be flawed, because it
overlooks other powerful players in the system such as
legislators, judges, and police.
Prosecutors are one of the many
important actors who populate the criminal
justice ecosystem. Police, legislators, judges,
governors, and parole boards are important
too. The cacophonic rhetoric of prosecutorial
dominance, however, ignores the agency of
these other actors, fostering a rhetorically
pleasing, but hopelessly flawed understanding
of the criminal justice system. This blinkered
approach overlooks the powerful forces that
can and do constrain prosecutors and diverts
attention from the most promising sources of
lasting reform, like legislators, judges, and
police, to the least.10
For present purposes, the most important source of
lasting reform is the legislature. While coming from a
different angle to Bellin, Davis has also argued that the
prosecution function is in great need of reform.
Davis supra note 6, at 55.
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION,
132 (2017).
10 Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV ., 171, 212
(2019).
8
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By creating more transparency in the
charging and plea-bargaining processes,
informing their constituents of their practices
and policies, and taking steps to eliminate race
and class inequities, prosecutors would go a
long way towards restoring fairness and the
balance of power in the American criminal
justice system.11
The Supreme Court of the United States has also
weighed into the argument of the importance of pleabargaining in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel. In Missouri v Frye 12 the
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right
extended to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are
rejected. The majority opinion of the Court was given by
Justice Kennedy who endorsed an analogy between plea
bargaining and horse-trading, going on to cite academic
authority for the proposition that the longer sentences in the
statute books existed for bargaining purposes.
“To a large extent . . . horse trading
[between prosecutor and defense counsel]
determines who goes to jail and for how long.
That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the
criminal justice system.” Scott & Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909,
1912 (1992). See also Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev.
989, 1034 (2006) (“[Defendants] who do take
their case to trial and lose receive longer
sentences than even Congress or the
prosecutor might think appropriate, because
the longer sentences exist on the books largely
for bargaining purposes. This often results in
individuals who accept a plea bargain
receiving shorter sentences than other
individuals who are less morally culpable but
11
12

Davis, supra note 6, at 66.
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
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take a chance and go to trial” (footnote
omitted)). In today’s criminal justice system,
therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain,
rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost
always the critical point for a defendant.13

In the above passage, Kennedy is making three
important points: (1) plea bargaining is not some adjunct to
the criminal justice system but rather personifies the
criminal justice system; (2) defendants face an unpalatable
choice between pleading guilty or facing a longer sentence if
found guilty at trial; and (3) the critical point for the
defendant is the plea bargain rather than the trial.
However, Kennedy also acknowledged that there
were positive benefits to plea bargaining.
To note the prevalence of plea
bargaining is not to criticize it. The potential
to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources
and for defendants to admit their crimes and
receive more favorable terms at sentencing
means that a plea agreement can benefit both
parties. In order that these benefits can be
realized, however, criminal defendants
require effective counsel during plea
negotiations.14
The recognition that criminal defendants require
effective counsel in order for plea bargaining to operate in an
even-handed manner is a point championed by Dripps, who
has categorized the 1990s as “a steroid era in criminal justice
… [i]n effect, the system splurged on crime control and
scrimped on due process.” 15 In marked contrast to Bellin’s
view that prosecutors are just one group of important players
in the criminal justice system, Dripps claims the criminal
justice system’s “overriding evil is the concentration of power
in executive hands.”16 For Dripps, the adoption by Congress
of Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum
Id. at 144.
Id.
15 Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence and Due Process of Plea Bargaining,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1350 (2016).
16 Id. at 1356.
13
14
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sentences had the effect of “dramatically augmenting
prosecutorial power.”17 Dripps views the guilty plea system
as undermining the principles of liberal democracy, with two
significant negative impacts flowing from prosecutorial
hegemony.
First, the system prosecutors have
dominated for the last thirty years has become
the most punitive in the world and indeed, if
we leave aside police states with camp
systems, perhaps in history. Second, the
arbitrary power to threaten catastrophic
conviction consequences endangers the
innocent - not only by confronting them with
irrational risks if they stand trial but also by
creating incentives to offer substantial
assistance to prosecutors even if the grounds
of cooperation need to be invented.18
In sum, Dripps concludes “plea incentives that would
make an innocent person likely to plead guilty violate due
process.” 19 Dripps likens the plea process to a coerced
confession in devising a standard as to whether the coerced
plea is unconstitutional.
Adapting the confessions test to the
plea process yields the following standard: if
the defense can show that in the totality of the
circumstances the potential trial sentence
threatens catastrophic consequences, such
that the risk of conviction at trial might induce
a reasonable, innocent person to plead guilty,

Id.
Id. at 1357 (citing Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of
Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 85-86 (2005))
(“The federal system over the last three decades has featured increasingly
severe sentences, and the adoption of federal sentencing guidelines in the
late 1980s enhanced the power of prosecutors and judges to reward
cooperation from defendants. In those districts where prosecutors took full
advantage of the tools available to them under the sentencing laws, it
became more expensive than ever for a federal defendant to insist on a
trial; fewer paid the price each year.”).
19 Id. at 1347.
17
18
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the plea has been coerced in violation of due
process.20

This begs the following question: does coercion by a
prosecutor which forces a defendant to give a full disclosure
undertaking in a civil action in exchange for criminal charges
being dropped offend the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause? It would appear to be at least arguable that
there is a prima facie conflict between lowering the shield of
the constitutionally enshrined Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination in a civil action by virtue of
termination of criminal prosecution on the same facts, and a
priori offending against the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause given the defendant has been coerced into
giving a full disclosure undertaking on pain of the criminal
charges being re-instated.

II. PENNSYLVANIA V. COSBY
Promises and pie-crust are made to be broken.21
In Pennsylvania v Cosby, 22 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania considered Cosby’s appeal on the issue of
whether given (a) District Attorney Castor’s agreement that
Cosby would not be prosecuted in order to force Cosby’s
testimony at a deposition in Constand’s civil action; (b) D. A.
Castor’s issuing a formal public statement reflecting that
agreement; and (c) Cosby’s reasonable reliance upon those
oral and written statements by providing deposition
testimony in the civil action, thus forfeiting his
constitutional right against self-incrimination, did the
Superior Court23 err in affirming the trial court’s decision to
allow not only the prosecution of Cosby but the admission of
Cosby’s civil deposition testimony?24
In sum, the legal question is “whether, and under
what circumstances, a prosecutor’s exercise of his or her
charging discretion binds future prosecutors’ exercise of the

Id. at 1388.
JONATHAN SWIFT, POLITE CONVERSATION (1738).
22 Pennsylvania v. Cosby, 236 A.3d 1045 (Pa. 2020) (per curiam)..
23 Id.
24 Pennsylvania v. Cosby, 252 A.3d 1092, 1128 (Pa. 2021).
20
21
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same discretion.”25 For reasons that will be discussed below,
the majority 26 held that the answer to the above legal
question is as follows:
[W]hen a prosecutor makes an
unconditional promise of non-prosecution, and
when the defendant relies upon that
guarantee to the detriment of his
constitutional right not to testify, the principle
of fundamental fairness that undergirds due
process of law in our criminal justice system
demands that the promise be enforced.27
In order to fully understand the reasons behind the
finding of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, it is first
necessary to set out the factual background.
In 2005, District Attorney Castor investigated
Andrea Constand’s claim that William Cosby had sexually
assaulted her in 2004 at his home. D.A. Castor determined
there would be difficulties in proceeding with a criminal
prosecution for five reasons: (1) Constand’s one year delay in
filing a complaint and inconsistencies in her various
statements to investigators which reflected on her credibility
as a witness; (2) the recurring interactions between
Constand and Cosby in the form of phone calls and meetings
after the alleged incident were atypical of behavior between
a complainant and alleged perpetrator; (3) Constand’s
contact with civil attorneys prior to filing the police
complaint in pursuit of financial compensation in a civil
action against Cosby, evidenced by Constand’s illegal
recording of telephone conversations with Cosby for the
likely purpose of securing payment in exchange for not
contacting the authorities; (4) the lack of corroborating
forensic evidence; and (5) the inadmissibility of evidence
from other potential claimants against Cosby. “The totality
of these circumstances led D.A. Castor to conclude that ‘there
was insufficient credible and admissible evidence upon

Id. at 1130.
Baer, C.J., Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy, JJ. Saylor J
dissented on the ground D.A. Castor’s decision was not binding on his
successors.
27 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1121.
25
26
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which any charge against Mr. Cosby related to the Constand
incident could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’”28
This left D.A. Castor in a dilemma because on the one
hand he believed the case against Cosby would fail, while on
the other hand he wanted some measure of justice for
Constand. D.A. Castor’s solution was to issue a press release,
having first told Cosby’s attorney Walter Phillips he was
going to make a public statement that he was not going to
charge Cosby, for the purpose of ensuring that “Mr. Cosby
would not be allowed to take the Fifth Amendment in the
subsequent civil suit that Andrea Constand’s lawyers had
told us they wanted to bring.”29 In the press release, D.A.
Castor stated he had concluded “that a conviction under the
circumstances of this case would be unattainable” 30 and
consequently declined to authorize the filing of charges.
However, for present purposes, it is the last paragraph of
D.A. Castor’s press release that warrants the closest
attention because it contains an implied threat to Cosby,
given D.A. Castor’s discussion with Attorney Phillips
regarding Cosby not being allowed to take the Fifth
Amendment in any subsequent civil action.
Because a civil action with a much
lower standard for proof is possible, the
District Attorney renders no opinion
concerning the credibility of any party
involved so as to not contribute to the publicity
and taint prospective jurors. The District
Attorney does not intend to expound publicly
on the details of his decision for fear that his
opinions and analysis might be given undue
weight by jurors in any contemplated civil
action. District Attorney Castor cautions all
parties to this matter that he will reconsider
this decision should the need arise. Much
exists in this investigation that could be used
(by others) to portray persons on both sides of
the issue in a less than flattering light. The
Id. at 1104 (citing Notes of Testimony Habeas Corpus Hearing, at 60
(Feb. 2, 2016).
29 Id. at 1104.
30 Id. at 1128 (citing Press Release, Feb. 17, 2005; N.T., Feb. 2, 2016, Exh.
D-4).
28
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District Attorney encourages the parties to
resolve their dispute from this point forward
with a minimum of rhetoric.31
The author has emphasized the sentence containing
the caution that the decision not to prosecute may be
reconsidered if the need arose, because it is contended D.A.
Castor intended to fire a warning shot across Cosby’s bows
that failure to testify and a decision to take the Fifth
Amendment would trigger a review of the evidence
potentially leading to a prosecution. The whole tone of the
paragraph above was to encourage the parties to quietly
resolve their dispute. In this, D.A. Castor clearly saw himself
as a ‘Minister of Justice.’
“He decided that a civil lawsuit for
money damages was her best option. To aid
Constand in that pursuit, ‘as the sovereign,’
the district attorney ‘decided that [his office]
would not prosecute Mr Cosby,’ believing that
his decision ultimately “would then set off the
chain of events that [he] thought as a Minister
of Justice would gain some justice for Andrea
Constand.’”32
Shortly after D.A. Castor issued his press release,
Constand filed a lawsuit against Cosby.33 During discovery,
Cosby gave four dispositions and “not once during the four
depositions did Cosby invoke the Fifth Amendment or even
mention it … no one involved with either side of the civil suit
indicated on the record a belief that Cosby could be
prosecuted in the future.”34 The outcome of the civil case, as
D.A. Castor had foreshadowed, was that “Constand settled
her civil suit with Cosby for $3.38 million.”35
However, the outcome of the civil case might have
been considerably different if Cosby had called D.A. Castor’s
Id. at 1138 (citing Press Release, Feb. 17, 2005; N.T., Feb. 2, 2016, Exh.
D-4 (Author’s emphasis)).
32 Id. at 1104 (citing Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), Habeas Corpus Hearing,
2/2/2016, at 63-64)).
33 Constand v. Cosby, 229 F.R.D. 472 (E.D. Pa. 2005),
34 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1106.
35 Id. at 1107.
31
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9 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2022)

bluff to reconsider a criminal prosecution should Cosby have
failed to co-operate in the civil case without further
assurances, bearing in mind the weaknesses in the evidence
against Cosby. At the very least, such intransigence from
Cosby would have forced one of two results: either D.A.
Castor would have been required to produce a written
guarantee of immunity against prosecution binding on the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or a court would have been
requested to issue an immunity order36 to similar effect by
holding D.A. Castor’s press release bound the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to honor the promise not to
prosecute, which is further discussed in Part IV. In either
event, 37 Cosby would have been able to rely on immunity
under the written guarantee or binding promise not to
prosecute, thereby minimizing (see discussion in Part IV as
to why the risk is not completely removed) any risk to Cosby
in testifying in Constand’s civil action. But, at the time, there
was every reason to believe, from Cosby’s perspective, that
the $3.38 million settlement was the end of the matter,
especially as Constand had specifically agreed not to
cooperate with any future efforts to prosecute Cosby as part
of the civil settlement.38
There matters stood for nearly ten years when
“following a media request, the federal judge who presided
over the civil suit unsealed the records in 2015” 39 which
included Cosby’s depositions. Nothing may have turned on
this development but for D.A. Castor having been succeeded
by D.A. Ferman, his former first assistant, who decided to
reopen the criminal investigation of Constand’s allegations.
Upon learning of D.A. Ferman’s intentions, former D.A.
Castor sent her an email attaching his press release.
The essence of the email to D.A. Ferman was to
explain that former D.A. Castor’s whole purpose back in 2005
was to force Cosby’s hand in a civil action with the agreement
of all parties.
[W]ith the agreement of the defense
lawyer
and
[Constand’s]
lawyers,
I
Pennsylvania’s immunity statute is codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947.
On one view, only an immunity order would have sufficed to bind the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
38 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1110.
39 Id. at 1107.
36
37
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intentionally and specifically bound the
Commonwealth that there would be no state
prosecution of Cosby in order to remove from
him the ability to claim his Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination, thus
forcing him to sit for a deposition under oath.40
The above passage from the email clearly sets out the
plea-bargaining deal to which all parties agreed. In effect,
D.A. Castor put a prosecutorial gun to Cosby’s head by
promising to bind the Commonwealth in exchange for his
civil testimony. However, there are two other important
points made by former D.A. Castor in his email. First, he
pointed out that “I never made an important decision
without discussing it with you during your tenure as First
Assistant.” 41 The implication is not only did D.A. Firman
already know of the substance of the email but also that she
had been fully consulted at the time.
Secondly, former D.A. Castor did not rule out any
other possible prosecutions against Cosby, just those based
on Cosby’s depositions in his civil action with Constand,
going as far as to state that ‘unless you can make out a case
without that deposition and without anything the deposition
led you to, I think Cosby would have an action against the
County and maybe even against you personally.’42
One may have thought such a warning might have
given D.A. Firman pause for thought, but she had her own
political agenda 43 and “asserted that, despite the public
press release, this was the first she had learned about a
binding understanding between the Commonwealth and
Cosby”44 and ‘requested a copy of any written agreement not
to prosecute Cosby.’45 Former D.A. Castor replied by email
which is set out in full below because it is central to all the
subsequent legal history of the case.

Id. at 1108 (citing N.T., Feb. 2, 2016, Exh. D-5 being an email sent on
September 23, 2015 from former D.A. Castor to D.A. Ferman and
attaching his February 17, 2005 press release).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1109.
43 D.A. Firman is now Judge Firman, having subsequently been elected to
a seat on the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.
44 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1109.
45 Id.
40
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The attached Press Release is the
written determination that we would not
prosecute Cosby. That was what the lawyers
for [Constand] wanted and I agreed. The
reason I agreed and the plaintiff’s lawyers
wanted it in writing is so that Cosby could not
take the 5th Amendment to avoid being
deposed or testifying. A sound strategy to
employ. That meant to all involved, including
Cosby’s lawyer at the time, Mr. Phillips, that
what Cosby said in the civil litigation could not
be used against him in a criminal prosecution
for the event we had him under investigation
for in early 2005. I signed the press release for
precisely this reason, at the request of
[Constand’s]
counsel,
and
with
the
acquiescence of Cosby’s counsel, with full and
complete intent to bind the Commonwealth
that anything Cosby said in the civil case could
not be used against him, thereby forcing him
to be deposed and perhaps testify in a civil
trial without him having the ability to “take
the 5th.” I decided to create the best possible
environment for [Constand] to prevail and be
compensated. By signing my name as District
Attorney and issuing the attached, I was
“signing off” on the Commonwealth not being
able to use anything Cosby said in the civil
case against him in a criminal prosecution,
because I was stating the Commonwealth will
not bring a case against Cosby for this incident
based upon then-available evidence in order to
help [Constand] prevail in her civil action.
Evidently, that strategy worked.
The attached, which was on letterhead
and signed by me as District Attorney, the
concept approved by [Constand’s] lawyers was
a “written declaration” from the Attorney for
the Commonwealth there would be no
prosecution based on anything Cosby said in
the civil action. Naturally, if a prosecution
could be made out without using what Cosby
said, or anything derived from what Cosby
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said, I believed then and continue to believe
that a prosecution is not precluded.46
Thus, the scene was set. Former D.A. Castor fully
explained his intentions in the matter and the fact that all
parties were agreed on the ‘deal’. However, D.A. Firman did
not consider she was bound by her predecessor’s press
release and along with her investigators ‘pressed forward,
reopening the criminal case against Cosby.’ 47 In December
2015, the Commonwealth charged Cosby with three counts
of aggravated indecent assault based on the January 2004
incident with Constand in Cosby’s home. 48 In January 2016,
Cosby filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to
have the charges dismissed on the basis of former D.A.
Castor’s purported promise not to prosecute Cosby. The trial
court denied Cosby’s petition because the only conclusion to
be drawn from the record “was that no agreement or promise
not to prosecute ever existed, only the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.”49
The trial court identified a variety of reasons to justify
its finding that no agreement ever existed:
1. Any agreement between then D.A. Castor
and Cosby was an incomplete and
unauthorized contemplation of transactional
immunity.50
2. Immunity can be conferred only upon strict
compliance with Pennsylvania’s immunity
statute, which is codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947,
and because former D.A. Castor did not seek
the court’s permission under the immunity
statute it followed that any purported

Id. (citing N.T., Feb. 2, 2016, Exh. D-7).
Id. at 1110.
48 By this time, First Assistant District Attorney Kevin R. Steele had
replaced Judge Ferman as District Attorney.
49 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1110 (citing Tr. Ct. Op. (“T.C.O”), May 14, 2019, at
62).
50 With respect, the trial court appears to have misunderstood
Pennsylvania’s immunity statute which is based on use and derivative use
immunity rather than transactional immunity, as discussed in Part IV.
46
47
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immunity offer through the press release was
defective, and thus invalid.
3. Former D.A. Castor’s testimony was
equivocal at best, and Attorney Troiani who
acted for Constand neither requested nor
agreed to an offer of immunity.
4. As Cosby maintained he had a consensual
sexual encounter with Constand, it was
unnecessary for former D.A. Castor to issue
the press release in anticipation of civil
litigation.
5. The Commonwealth was not estopped from
prosecuting Cosby because there was no
written documentation to evidence that an
offer not to prosecute had ever been extended.
Consequently, in May 2016 all of Cosby’s charges
were held for trial,51 and “at the conclusion of a second jury
trial, Cosby was convicted on all three counts of aggravated
indecent assault.”52 The Superior Court53 affirmed the trial
court’s decision to allow not only the prosecution of Cosby but
the admission of Cosby’s civil deposition testimony, which
formed the central plank for Cosby’s petition for allowance of
appeal granted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
2020.54
In undertaking the review of the appeal, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania commenced by ascertaining the legal
relationship between D.A. Castor and Cosby, and found the
record supported the conclusion that D.A. Castor’s actions
amounted only to a unilateral exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Consequently, the Supreme Court characterized
what occurred between D.A. Castor and Cosby as being “not
an agreement, a contract, or any kind of quid pro quo
exchange.”55 As a result, the legal question became “whether,
and under what circumstances, a prosecutor’s exercise of his

Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1118.
Id. at 1123,
53 Constand, 236 A.3d at 1045.
54 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 100.
55 Id. at 1130.
51
52
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or her charging discretion binds future prosecutors’ exercise
of the same discretion.”56
In answering this question, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania began its analysis of the relevant authorities
by noting the various roles prosecutors inhabit in the
criminal justice system.
Prosecutors are more than mere
participants in our criminal justice system. As
we explained in Commonwealth v. Clancy, 192
A.3d 44 (Pa. 2018), prosecutors inhabit three
distinct and equally critical roles: they are
officers of the court, advocates for victims, and
administrators of justice. Id. at 52. As the
Commonwealth’s representatives, prosecutors
are duty-bound to pursue “equal and impartial
justice,” Appeal of Nicely, 18 A. 737, 738 (Pa.
1889), and “to serve the public interest.”
Clancy, 192 A.3d 52. Their obligation is “not
merely to convict,” but rather to “seek justice
within the bounds of the law.” Commonwealth
v. Starks, 387 A.2d 829, 831 (Pa. 1978).57
Given the enormous discretion accorded to
prosecutors, “our law has long recognized the special weight
that must be accorded to their assurances.”58 In support of
this proposition, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the
context of guilty plea negotiations, cited Santobello v. New
York59 where the Supreme Court of the United States held
that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise
or agreement by the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must
be fulfilled.” 60 However, the Supreme Court of the United
States clarified in a later decision, Mabry v. Johnson,61 that

Id.
Id. at 1131.
58 Id.
59 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
60 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1132 (Pa. 2021) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (emphasis added)).
61 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
56
57
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the defendant’s guilty plea must be made in actual reliance
on the promise in the plea agreement.62
While the Supreme Court of the United States did not
explicitly ground its holding in Santobello v. New York63 in
due process guarantees, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
considered it was “only sensible to read Santobello’s holding
as resting upon due process principles because - as Justice
Douglas noted in his concurring opinion - without a
constitutional basis the Court would have lacked jurisdiction
over what was otherwise a state law matter.”64
Surprisingly, given the context of the Cosby case, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not cite the opening
paragraph of Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion.
I agree … that New York did not keep
its ‘plea bargain’ with petitioner and that it is
no excuse for the default merely because a
member of the prosecutor’s staff who was not
a party to the ‘plea bargain’ was in charge of
the case when it came before the New York
court. The staff of the prosecution is a unit and
each member must be presumed to know the
commitments made by any other member. If
responsibility could be evaded that way, the
prosecution would have designed another
deceptive ‘contrivance,’ akin to those we
condemned in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, 112, and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264.65
Justice Douglas’s reference in the above passage to
Mooney v. Holohan 66 is authority for the principle that a
criminal conviction procured by the state prosecuting
The issue in Mabry v. Johnson was whether if a criminal defendant
accepted a prosecutor’s proposed plea deal, is he or she constitutionally
protected from having that offer subsequently withdrawn, which the
Supreme Court of the United States answered in the negative. As the
respondent’s plea was not induced by the withdrawn offer, it did not affect
the voluntariness of his plea and consequently there was no Fourteenth
Amendment claim.
63 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
64 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1132 (Douglas, J. concurring) (citing Santobello, 404
U.S., at 266-67))).
65 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264 (Douglas J. concurring).
66 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
62
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authorities solely by the use of perjured testimony known by
them to be perjured and knowingly used by them in order to
procure the conviction is without due process of law, and in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such a contrivance by a state to
procure the conviction and imprisonment of a
defendant is an inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice as is the
obtaining of a like result by intimidation. And
the action of prosecuting officers on behalf of
the state, like that of administrative officers in
the execution of its laws, may constitute state
action within the purview of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That amendment governs any
action of a state, ‘whether through its
legislature, through its courts, or through its
executive or administrative officers.’67
Similarly, in Napue v. Illinois68 the Supreme Court of
the United States reaffirmed the principle that the failure of
the prosecutor to correct the testimony of the witness which
he knew to be false denied the petitioner due process of law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Given the observation by Justice Douglas cited above
that ‘the staff of the prosecution is a unit and each member
must be presumed to know the commitments made by any
other member’, arguably the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania designed a deceptive contrivance to use
Cosby’s civil testimony in Constand’s case in a later criminal
trial when the head of the prosecution unit, D.A. Castor, had
expressly indicated in a press release that there would be no
prosecution of Cosby based on the facts in Constand’s case.
There would be no issue had the prosecution solely
used the testimony of women other than Constand whom
Cosby had allegedly sexually abused, but that is not the
approach the prosecution adopted. Instead, they led with
admissions made by Cosby in his civil testimony and
buttressed this evidence with other alleged ‘bad acts’
committed by Cosby which were not pursued due to the
67
68

Id. at 112-13 (citing Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900)).
360 U.S. 264, 265 (1959).
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Statute of Limitations. In other words, the prosecution made
a conscious decision that using Cosby’s civil testimony in
Constand’s case was the most expedient method to secure a
conviction. Is this stratagem not on all fours with Mooney v.
Holohan and Napue v. Illinois in that the state prosecuting
authorities used Cosby’s civil testimony knowing the
intimidatory and promissory circumstances under which it
had been extracted?
Furthermore, as will be discussed in Part III, was
Cosby not coerced into making the four depositions in
Constand’s civil case under threat of criminal proceedings
being reopened? In other words, the prosecution knew that
Cosby’s depositions were not voluntary and had been exacted
at a price.
In any event, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
building on the authority of Santobello v. New York,69 went
on to cite its own previous authority in Commonwealth v.
Zuber,70 a case involving the specific performance of a plea
bargain.
[T]here is an affirmative duty on the
part of the prosecutor to honor any and all
promises made in exchange for a defendant’s
plea. Our courts have demanded strict
compliance with that duty in order to avoid
any possible perversion of the plea bargaining
system, evidencing the concern that a
defendant might be coerced into a bargain or
fraudulently induced to give up the very
valued constitutional guarantees attendant
the right to trial by jury.
Therefore, in Pennsylvania, it is well
settled that where a plea bargain has been
entered into and is violated by the
Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled, at
the least, to the benefit of the bargain.71
Thus, the essential point being made by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania was that “interactions between a
prosecutor
and a
criminal
defendant, including
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 257.
353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976).
71 Id. at 444.
69
70
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circumstances where the latter seeks enforcement of some
promise or assurance made by the former, are not immune
from the dictates of due process and fundamental fairness.”72
However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania continued by
calling in aid contract law to bolster its view that the
obligations between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant
“can involve precepts of contract law, which inform the due
process inquiry,” 73 citing in support Puckett v. United
States.74
Although the analogy may not hold in
all respects, plea bargains are essentially
contracts. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,
508 (1984). When the consideration for a
contract fails that is, when one of the
exchanged promises is not kept, we do not say
that the voluntary bilateral consent to the
contract never existed, so that it is
automatically and utterly void; we say that the
contract was broken …
When a defendant agrees to a plea
bargain, the Government takes on certain
obligations. If those obligations are not met,
the defendant is entitled to seek a remedy,
which might in some cases be rescission of the
agreement, allowing him to take back the
consideration he has furnished, i.e., to
withdraw his plea. But rescission is not the
only possible remedy; in Santobello we allowed
for a resentencing at which the Government
would fully comply with the agreement - in
effect, specific performance of the contract. 404
U.S., at 263. In any case, it is entirely clear
that a breach does not cause the guilty plea,
when entered, to have been unknowing or
involuntary. It is precisely because the plea
was knowing and voluntary (and hence valid)
that the Government is obligated to uphold its
side of the bargain.75
Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1133.
Id.
74 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009).
75 Id. at 138.
72
73
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Thus, on the authority of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the litmus test in the context of plea bargains
as contracts is whether the plea was ‘knowing and voluntary’
which binds the Government to perform ‘its side of the
bargain.’ Following the principle established in Puckett v.
United States, 76 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set
down three requirements the aggrieved party must prove in
order to succeed in a claim of promissory estoppel.
(1) the promisor acted in a manner that he or
she should have reasonably expected to induce
the other party into taking (or not taking)
certain action; (2) the aggrieved party actually
took such action; and (3) an injustice would
result if the assurance that induced the action
was not enforced.77
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that
Cosby satisfied the above three criteria. One step in reaching
this conclusion was the Court’s holding in Commonwealth v.
Martinez78 that, once a bargained term is enveloped within a
plea agreement, a defendant “is entitled to the benefit of his
bargain through specific performance of terms of the plea
agreement.”79
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania continued by
pointing out that “the applicability of contract law principles
to criminal negotiations is not limited to the plea bargaining
process,” citing United States v. Carrillo80 as authority for
the principle that “fundamental fairness requires a
prosecutor to uphold his or her end of a non-prosecution
agreement.”81 This led to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
to hold that “prosecutors can be bound by their assurances
or decisions under principles of contract law or by application
of the fundamental fairness considerations … particularly
when defendants rely to their detriment upon those
guarantees.”82 The fundamental fairness considerations are
Id.
Cosby, 252 A.3d 1092 at 1133.
78 147 A.3d 517, 520 (Pa. 2016).
79 Id. at 533.
80 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1133.
81 See United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1983).
82 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1134.
76
77
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underpinned by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution which “mandate that all
interactions between the government and the individual are
conducted in accordance with the protections of due
process.”83
Thus, when a non-prosecution decision is
“unconditional, is presented as absolute and final, or is
announced in such a way that it induces the defendant to act
in reliance thereupon … due process may warrant preclusion
of the prosecution.” 84 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
found in Cosby’s case that “a defendant’s detrimental
reliance upon the government’s assurances during the plea
bargaining phase both implicates his due process rights and
entitles him to enforcement even of unconsummated
agreements.”85 In coming to this conclusion, the critical fact
for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was the “objectively
indisputable evidence of record demonstrating D.A. Castor’s
patent intent to induce Cosby’s reliance upon the nonprosecution decision.”86
Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania found that a reasonable observer
would have concluded that D.A. Castor’s decision not to
prosecute was permanent,87 but the due process entitlement
only arose because Cosby detrimentally relied upon the
Commonwealth’s decision for which the evidence was
Cosby’s “counseled decision to testify in four depositions in
Constand’s civil case without ever invoking his Fifth
Amendment rights.”88 Further evidence for Cosby’s reliance
on D.A. Castor’s decision can be found in the fact that “when
Cosby attempted to decline to answer certain questions
about Constand, Constand’s attorneys obtained a ruling from
the civil trial judge forcing Cosby to answer.”89 Thus, the only
remaining question was whether Cosby’s reliance was
reasonable.

See id.; Commonwealth v. Sims, 919 A.2d 931, 941 n.6 (Pa. 2007).
Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1135.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1137.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1138.
89 Id. at 1139.
83
84
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On this question, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
found “nothing unreasonable about Cosby’s reliance upon his
attorneys and upon D.A. Castor’s public announcement of
the Commonwealth’s charging decision.” 90 Consequently,
“the subsequent decision by successor D.A.s to prosecute
Cosby violated Cosby’s due process rights.”91 In terms of a
remedy, specific performance of D.A. Castor’s decision
compelled “the Montgomery County District Attorney’s
Office to stand by the decision of its former elected head.”92
In a recent development, the current Montgomery
County District Attorney, Kevin Steele, has petitioned the
United States Supreme Court seeking to reinstate Cosby’s
sexual assault conviction on the ground that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had given D.A. Castor’s press release
the legal weight of an immunity agreement, calling the
court’s decision “an indefensible rule.”93 The outcome of the
petition will not be known for several months, but as the
United States Supreme Court only accepts fewer that 1% of
the petitions it receives and four of the nine justices on the
court have to agree to hear the case, the likelihood of the
petition going to a full hearing is very slim.

III. FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The Committee wants me to answer charges without
facing my accusers … I am therefore, by advice of my counsel,
forced to take the Fifth Amendment today until I can get a
venue where I can face my accusers.94
The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment reads
as follows: “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The
importance of these two clauses has been underlined by the
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1143.
92 Id. at 1144.
93 Maryclaire Dale, Cosby Prosecutors Urge Supreme Court to Restore
Conviction, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bc-us-bill-cosby
_n_61a60842e4b0ae9a42b34dfe (last visited Nov. 30, 2021).
94 Carrie Johnson, HealthSouth’s Ex-CEO Takes the Fifth, The
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/
2003/10/17/healthsouths-ex-ceo-takes-the-fifth/8c58dc15-fccd-4db1-8bc98b9de08c22c5/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2022).
90
91
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Supreme Court of the United States. In Malloy v. Hogan,95
the Court recognized “that the American system of criminal
prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the
Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.”96 By
virtue of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a person’s
rights under the Fifth Amendment are extended to the
States:
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
The italicized words in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment above mirror the language of the Fifth
Amendment. Effectively, the Fifth Amendment protects
persons from actions of the federal government, while the
Fourteenth Amendment enshrines the same protection to
persons from actions by the States. As the Supreme Court of
the United States has affirmed, the Fourteenth Amendment
“secures against state invasion the same privilege that the
Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer
no penalty . . . for such silence.”97 Indeed, one Supreme Court
Justice has put the widest possible construction on the reach
of the Fifth Amendment:
The
guarantee
against
selfincrimination contained in the Fifth
Amendment is not only a protection against
conviction and prosecution, but a safeguard of
conscience and human dignity and freedom of
expression, as well. My view is that the
Framers put it beyond the power of Congress
to compel anyone to confess his crimes. The
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541
(1961)).
97 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8.
95
96
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evil to be guarded against was partly selfaccusation under legal compulsion. But that
was only a part of the evil. The conscience and
dignity of man were also involved.98

While there is academic debate as to whether the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect procedural or
substantive due process, in large part due to different
interpretations or understandings of the term “due process
of law” between 1791 when the Fifth Amendment was
ratified and 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was
proclaimed,99 the better view is that the two Amendments
share a common original meaning as expressed by Justice
Frankfurter.
The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has an independent
potency, precisely as does the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment in relation to
the Federal Government. It ought not to
require argument to reject the notion that due
process of law meant one thing in the Fifth
Amendment and another in the Fourteenth.
The Fifth Amendment specifically prohibits
prosecution of an ‘infamous crime’ except upon
indictment; it forbids double jeopardy; it bars
compelling a person to be a witness against
himself in any criminal case: it precludes
deprivation of ‘life, liberty, or property without
due process of law …’ Are Madison and his
contemporaries in the framing of the Bill of
Rights to be charged with writing into it a
meaningless clause? To consider ‘due process
of law’ as merely a shorthand statement of
other specific clauses in the same amendment
is to attribute to the authors and proponents
of this Amendment ignorance of, or
indifference to, a historic conception which
was one of the great instruments in the
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445-46 (1956) (Douglas J.,
dissenting).
99 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process
Clause, 120 YALE L. J. 408, 417 (2010).
98
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arsenal of constitutional freedom which the
Bill of Rights was to protect and strengthen.100
Further support for the broad reach of the term “due
process of law” can be found in Supreme Court dicta that due
process acts as a buttress for the fundamental right of liberty
against oppressive government, whether federal or state.
Immunities that are valid as against
the federal government by force of the specific
pledges of particular amendments [here
referring to the First and Sixth Amendments]
have been found to be implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, and thus, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as
against the states.101
Similarly, in United States v. Carolene Products
Company, 102 while the Supreme Court upheld the federal
government’s power to prohibit filled milk from being
shipped in interstate commerce by adopting a deferential
standard of review that treated economic regulations as
‘presumptively constitutional’ under a doctrine known as the
‘rational basis test’, the Court indicated it would adopt a
stricter standard of review where a law appeared on its face
to violate a provision of the United States Constitution.
There may be narrower scope for
operation
of
the
presumption
of
constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.103
Dubbed the most famous constitutional footnote in
history, clearly the stricter standard of review applies to the
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66-67 (1947) (Frankfurter J.,
concurring).
101 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
102 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938).
103 Id. at 152 n.4 (1938).
100
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Fifth Amendment which mirrors rather than embraces the
Fourteenth Amendment. This stricter standard was applied
in Garrity v. New Jersey,104 a case which is exactly on point
with the facts in Cosby to the extent that both cases involve
coercion.
In Garrity, the appellants were New Jersey police
officers who were under investigation for traffic ticket
‘fixing’. Each officer was given a choice: they could refuse to
answer if disclosure would tend to incriminate him, but a
refusal to answer would leave the officer subject to removal
from office under the New Jersey forfeiture-of-office statute.
The officers’ answers were used in subsequent prosecutions,
which resulted in their each being convicted. The question
before the Supreme Court was whether the threat of removal
from public office under the New Jersey forfeiture-of-office
statute constituted coercion and rendered the resulting
statements involuntary, and therefore inadmissible in the
state criminal proceedings. Justice Douglas delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The choice imposed on petitioners was
one between self-incrimination or job
forfeiture. Coercion that vitiates a confession
under Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, and
related cases can be “mental, as well as
physical”; “the blood of the accused is not the
only hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199, 206. Subtle pressures (Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503) may be as telling as coarse and vulgar
ones. The question is whether the accused was
deprived of his “free choice to admit, to deny,
or to refuse to answer.” Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 241 …
We held in Slochower v. Board of
Education, 350 U.S. 551, that a public-school
teacher could not be discharged merely
because he had invoked the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when
questioned by a congressional committee:
104

385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967).
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“The privilege against
self-incrimination would be
reduced to a hollow mockery if
its exercise could be taken as
equivalent either to a confession
of [385 U.S. 493, 500] guilt or a
conclusive
presumption
of
perjury … The privilege serves
to protect the innocent who
otherwise might be ensnared by
ambiguous circumstances.” Id.,
at 557-558.
We conclude that policemen, like
teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a
watered-down version of constitutional rights.
There are rights of constitutional
stature whose exercise a State may not
condition by the exaction of a price … We now
hold the protection of the individual under the
Fourteenth Amendment against coerced
statements prohibits use in subsequent
criminal proceedings of statements obtained
under threat of removal from office, and that
it extends to all, whether they are policemen
or other members of our body politic.105
As seen in Part II, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania relied on promissory estoppel to conclude
specific performance of D.A. Castor’s decision compelled “the
Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office to stand by
the decision of its former elected head.”106 However, arguably
the better view is that Cosby was coerced into making four
depositions in Constand’s civil case under threat of D.A.
Castor reopening the prospect of criminal proceedings
against Cosby. Is there any real difference between a police
officer being coerced into making admissions for fear of
forfeiting his job as in Garrity, and a suspect being offered
the choice of making depositions in a civil case or facing
105
106

Id. at 496, 499-500 (1967).
Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1150.
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criminal proceedings? Did D.A. Castor not invoke the same
mental coercion referred to by Justice Douglas in the above
passage from Garrity, and condition Cosby’s constitutional
rights by the exaction of a price?
The United States Supreme Court has consistently
expressed the view, in both the 19 th and 20th centuries, that
the Court is the guardian of the rights guaranteed to citizens
under the Constitution, and that the Court must remain
vigilant against any attempt to whittle down those rights. In
Boyd v. United States, 107 the Court observed that
“constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed … it is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”108
As the Supreme Court noted some seventy-five years later
“in this jealous regard for maintaining the integrity of
individual rights, the [Supreme] Court gave life to Madison’s
prediction that ‘independent tribunals of justice … will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the
declaration of rights.’”109
More specifically, the Supreme Court described the
Fifth Amendment as being a provision that “must have a
broad construction in favor of the right which it was intended
to secure,” 110 which was affirmed in Quinn v. United
States.111
Such
liberal
construction
is
particularly warranted in a prosecution of a
witness for a refusal to answer, since the
respect normally accorded the privilege is then
buttressed by the presumption of innocence
accorded a defendant in a criminal trial. To
apply the privilege narrowly or begrudgingly to treat it as an historical relic, at most merely

116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Id. at 635.
109 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961) (citing I Annals of Cong. 439
(1789))).
110 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
111 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
107
108
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to be tolerated - is to ignore its development
and purpose.112
Similarly, at trial in Grunewald v. United States113,
one of three petitioners, Halperin, answered certain
questions in a manner consistent with innocence and then,
over his objection, was subjected to cross-examination which
revealed that he had refused to answer the same questions,
on grounds of possible self-incrimination, while he was
appearing before a grand jury, under subpoena. Justice
Black strongly criticized the trial judge’s summing up as
undermining privileges enshrined in the Constitution.
At the conclusion of the trial the judge
instructed the jury that Halperin's claim of his
constitutional privilege not to be a witness
against himself could be considered in
determining what weight should be given to
his testimony - in other words, whether
Halperin was a truthful and trustworthy
witness. I agree with the Court that use of this
claim of constitutional privilege to reflect upon
Halperin's credibility was error, but I do not,
like the Court, rest my conclusion on the
special circumstances of this case. I can think
of no special circumstances that would justify
use of a constitutional privilege to discredit or
convict a person who asserts it. The value of
constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if
persons can be penalized for relying on them.
It seems peculiarly incongruous and
indefensible for courts which exist and act only
under the Constitution to draw inferences of
lack of honesty from invocation of a privilege
deemed worthy of enshrinement in the
Constitution.114
Furthermore, in Application of Gault, 115 a case
involving the question of whether juvenile proceedings were
Id. at 162.
353 U.S. 391 (1957).
114 Grunewald, 353 U.S at 425-26 (Black J., concurring).
115 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
112
113
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‘criminal’ or ‘civil’, the Supreme Court stressed that the
availability of the Fifth Amendment did not turn on the
nature of the proceedings, and under the Constitution
dealing with a boy did not justify a kangaroo court.
[I]t is also clear that the availability of
the privilege does not turn upon the type of
proceeding in which its protection is invoked,
but upon the nature of the statement or
admission and the exposure which it invites.
The privilege may, for example, be claimed in
a civil or administrative proceeding, if the
statement is or may be inculpatory.116
Perhaps, for the present purpose of examining the
implications of the Cosby ruling, the most powerful
statement by the Supreme Court as to the purpose and
strength of the Fifth Amendment can be found in Hoffman v.
United States.117
This guarantee against testimonial
compulsion, like other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, ‘was added to the original Constitution
in the conviction that too high a price may be
paid even for the unhampered enforcement of
the criminal law and that, in its attainment,
other social objects of a free society should not
be sacrificed.’118
The reference in the above passage to the price of
unhampered enforcement of the criminal law may be too
high on occasions has a particular resonance in the Cosby
case. One of the objects of a free society that was arguably
sacrificed in the pursuit and trial of Cosby is the protection
of the citizen from the untrammelled power of the state. In
this case, the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office
purported to act with unfettered power to renege on a nonId. at 49.
341 U.S. 479 (1951).
118 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (citing Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489
(1944). See Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 72-73 (1920); Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
116
117
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prosecution agreement coerced by its former head, D.A.
Castor, whereby Cosby’s Fifth Amendment rights were
stripped away in Constand’s civil action leading to
incriminating depositions by Cosby, which were then
cynically used by the D.A’s Office to resurrect a criminal
prosecution against Cosby who had already paid $3.38
million in compensation to Constand as D.A. Castor had
originally intended. Such an underhand course of action flies
in the face of both the objective of the Fifth Amendment and
the way the Fifth Amendment has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States.

IV. GUARANTEE OF IMMUNITY AGAINST PROSECUTION
It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer.119
In this Part, the options available to a person in
Cosby’s position are discussed. In Part II, reference was
made to Cosby, in order to fully protect himself with the
benefit of hindsight, refusing to give depositions in the
Constand civil case until either D.A. Castor produced a
written guarantee of immunity against prosecution binding
on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or a court had issued
an immunity order 120 to similar effect by holding D.A.
Castor’s press release bound the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to honor the promise not to prosecute. In
Cosby, the trial court found that “immunity can be conferred
only upon strict compliance with Pennsylvania’s immunity
statute, which is codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947.”121 It is now
appropriate to consider this immunity statute more fully.
§ 5947. Immunity of witnesses.
(a) General rule. - Immunity orders
shall be available under this section in all
proceedings before:
(1) Courts …
William Blackstone. Vol. 1V. Blackstone's Commentaries, Chapter 27.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5947 (1980).
121 Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1117.
119
120
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(b) Request and issuance. - The
Attorney General or a district attorney may
request an immunity order from any judge of
a designated court, and that judge shall issue
such an order, when in the judgment of the
Attorney General or district attorney:
(1) the testimony or other
information from a witness may be
necessary to the public interest; and
(2) a witness has refused or is
likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination.
(c) Order to testify. - Whenever a
witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or provide
other information in a proceeding specified in
subsection (a), and the person presiding at
such proceeding communicates to the witness
an immunity order, that witness may not
refuse to testify based on his privilege against
self-incrimination.
(d) Limitation on use. No testimony or
other information compelled under an
immunity order, or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information, may be used against a
witness in any criminal case, except that such
information may be used:
(1) in a prosecution under 18
Pa.C.S. § 4902 (relating to perjury) or
under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4903 (relating to
false swearing);
(2) in a contempt proceeding for
failure to comply with an immunity
order; or
(3) as evidence, where otherwise
admissible, in any proceeding where
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defendant.122

is

not

a

criminal

Recall from Part II that the trial court in Cosby’s case
held that immunity could be conferred only upon strict
compliance with Pennsylvania’s immunity statute, and
because former D.A. Castor did not seek the court’s
permission under the immunity statute it followed that any
purported immunity offer through the press release was
defective, and thus invalid. Additionally, from Part II that
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the record
supported the conclusion that D.A. Castor’s actions
amounted only to a unilateral exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Thus, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not
pursue the question of how Cosby could have protected
himself against the vagaries, even volte-face, of the
Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, which is the
focus of this article.
Instead, for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the
legal question became, of necessity, the circumstances under
which a prosecutor’s exercise of his or her charging discretion
bound future prosecutors’ exercise of the same discretion. In
answering this legal question, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania set down three requirements the aggrieved
party must prove in order to succeed in a claim of promissory
estoppel. However, as was put forward in Part III, arguably
the better view is that Cosby was coerced into making four
depositions in Constand’s civil case under threat of D.A.
Castor reopening the prospect of criminal proceedings
against Cosby. In other words, the prosecution was estopped
from pursuing Cosby because the prosecution knew that
Cosby’s depositions were not voluntary and had been exacted
at a price. More fundamentally, the Montgomery County
District Attorney’s Office has laid itself open to the charge of
a priori offending against the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause given the defendant Cosby had been coerced
into giving a full disclosure undertaking on pain of the
criminal charges being re-instated.
Be that as it may, a person in Cosby’s position needs
greater certainty than reliance on the doctrine of promissory
estoppel or potential offending against the Fourteenth
122

42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5947 (1980).
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Amendment due process clause. Reliance on the common law
has always been fraught with difficulty as courts regularly
confine precedents to their facts or distinguish the case in
question on its facts from decided precedents. The raft of
cases discussed in Part III dealing with Fifth Amendment
rights only provide a guide to any given case outcome. Whilst
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania eventually righted the
wrong inflicted on Cosby, he still served three years in jail
before his conviction was quashed and he was set free. The
holy grail is immunity. The question then becomes: how to
secure such
immunity
before giving potentially
incriminating depositions in a civil case?
As can be seen from § 5947(b) above, permission from
a court is a prerequisite to any offer of immunity, although
the statutory language used appears to imply that the court
is obliged to issue such an order (‘the judge shall issue such
an order’) when ‘in the judgment of the Attorney General or
district attorney’ the conditions specified in § 5947(b)(1) and
(2) are satisfied. These two conditions are (1) the testimony
of the witness ‘may be necessary to the public interest’ and
(2) the witness is otherwise claiming privilege against selfincrimination. Thus, consistent with the wide-ranging power
and discretion of a District Attorney discussed in Part I, it is
the judgment of the relevant District Attorney that is
determinative of whether the two conditions specified in §
5947(b) have been met. ‘Judgment’ is a very subjective and
personal word. Furthermore, of some significance is the
general language employed in each condition such as the use
of the word ‘may’ as regards being in the public interest, and
‘likely’ to refuse to testify. Both words present the relevant
District Attorney with wide discretion in exercising his or her
judgment in requesting an immunity order.
Consequently, had Cosby and his attorneys been less
trusting of D.A. Castor’s press release providing the
necessary assurance that no future prosecution would be
forthcoming based on Constand’s complaint, there would
appear to have been no obstacle to an immunity order being
granted by the court. This conclusion follows if the public
interest is defined as providing some measure of justice for
Constand’s civil case, which was D.A. Castor’s expressed
purpose in issuing the press release. Given that the litmus
test for granting the immunity order is ‘the judgment of the
district attorney’, it would appear that D.A. Castor’s request
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for an immunity order for Cosby would have been a fait
accompli, as Cosby had already indicated he would exercise
his privilege against self-incrimination meeting the second
condition in § 5947(b).
Arguably, it would have been open to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania to have decided the case on the basis
that because Cosby had relied on the press release and an
immunity order would have been forthcoming if Cosby had
insisted, then equity required the original position taken by
D.A. Castor of no prosecution against Cosby to be restored as
though the immunity order had been granted by the court.
As discussed in Part II, evidence for Cosby’s reliance on D.A.
Castor’s decision can be found in the fact that “when Cosby
attempted to decline to answer certain questions about
Constand, Constand’s attorneys obtained a ruling from the
civil trial judge forcing Cosby to answer.”123 In light of this
ruling, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania could have held
that Cosby was acting as though an immunity order had
been granted.
Immunity orders have both a federal and state
pedigree. In Kastigar v. United States,124 the United States
Supreme Court had cause to consider 18 U.S. Code § 6002
and § 6003.
18 U.S. Code § 6002 - Immunity
generally
Whenever a witness refuses, on the
basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, to testify or provide other
information in a proceeding before or ancillary
to –
(1) a court or grand jury of the United
States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint
committee of the two Houses, or a committee
or a subcommittee of either House,
123
124

Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1139.
406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972).
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and the person presiding over the
proceeding communicates to the witness an
order issued under this title, the witness may
not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against selfincrimination; but no testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be
used against the witness in any criminal case,
except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order.125
18 U.S. Code § 6003 – Court and grand
jury proceedings
(a) In the case of any individual who
has been or may be called to testify or provide
other information at any proceeding before or
ancillary to a court of the United States or a
grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court for the judicial district in
which the proceeding is or may be held shall
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section, upon the request of the United States
attorney for such district, an order requiring
such individual to give testimony or provide
other information which he refuses to give or
provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, such order to become
effective as provided in section 6002 of this
title.
(b) A United States attorney may, with
the approval of the Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, the Associate
Attorney General, or any designated Assistant
Attorney General or Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, request an order under
125

18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West 1970).
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subsection (a) of this section when in his
judgment –
(1) the testimony or other
information from such individual may
be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused
or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination.126
The wide-ranging power and discretion of a District
Attorney in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(b) is replicated for a United
States Attorney in 18 U.S. Code § 6003(b). More specifically,
the United States Department of Justice’s website identifies
six representative not all-inclusive factors relevant to the
weighing exercise of whether an immunity order is necessary
in the public interest for the purpose of § 6003(b)(1) above.
9-23.210 - DECISION TO REQUEST
IMMUNITY—THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Section 6003(b) of Title 18, United
States Code, authorizes a United States
Attorney to request immunity when, in his/her
judgment, the testimony or other information
that is expected to be obtained from the
witness “may be necessary to the public
interest.” Some of the factors that should be
weighed in making this judgment include:
A. The importance of the investigation
or prosecution to effective enforcement of the
criminal laws;
B. The value of the person's testimony
or information to the investigation or
prosecution;
C. The likelihood of prompt and full
compliance with a compulsion order, and the
effectiveness of available sanctions if there is
no such compliance;
126

18 U.S.C.A. § 6003 (West 1970).
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D. The person's relative culpability in
connection with the offense or offenses being
investigated or prosecuted, and his or her
criminal history;
E. The possibility of successfully
prosecuting the person prior to compelling his
or her testimony;
F. The likelihood of adverse collateral
consequences to the person if he or she
testifies under a compulsion order.
These factors are not intended to be allinclusive or to require a particular decision in
a particular case. They are, however,
representative of the kinds of factors that
should be considered when deciding whether
to seek immunity.127

Before examining the decision in Kastigar v. United
States, two points need to be raised. First, it should be noted
that the statutory language as to the limitation on the use of
the evidence which is the subject of the immunity order is
virtually identical as between 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(d) and 18
U.S. Code § 6002. Secondly, as Koontz and Stodel observe,
there are three types of immunity statute. Both 42 Pa.C.S. §
5947(d) and 18 U.S. Code § 6002 are examples of use and
derivative use immunity statutes.
Immunity statutes may be separated
into three categories. Use immunity statutes
prohibit only the subsequent use of the
compelled testimony in criminal prosecutions
against the witness. Use and derivative use
immunity statutes prohibit the subsequent
use of compelled testimony and any evidence
derived from such testimony in criminal
prosecutions
against
the
witness.
Transactional immunity statutes prohibit the

United States Department of Justice, 9-23.100 WITNESS IMMUNITY,
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-23000-witness-immunity (last visited
Jan. 27, 2022).
127
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prosecution of the witness in regard to any
matter relating to which he testified.128
Thus, transactional immunity is effectively blanket or
total immunity, whereas use and derivative use immunity
only prevents the prosecution from using the witness’s own
testimony or any evidence derived from that testimony. Any
objective reading of D.A. Castor’s press release leads to the
conclusion that had D.A. Castor sought an immunity order it
would have been use and derivative use immunity, which is
also consistent with 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(d). Furthermore, had
D.A. Castor obtained evidence independent of Cosby’s
testimony which substantiated Constand’s complaint
against Cosby, then Cosby could have been prosecuted under
a use and derivative use immunity order.
Mr. Justice Powell, who delivered the opinion of the
court in Kastigar v. United States, 129 set out the question
before the Supreme Court as follows.
This case presents the question
whether the United States Government may
compel testimony from an unwilling witness,
who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, by
conferring on the witness immunity from use
of the compelled testimony in subsequent
criminal proceedings, as well as immunity
from use of evidence derived from the
testimony.130
The plain language of 18 U.S. Code § 6002 above
clearly suggests an affirmative answer to the question above
presented by Mr. Justice Powell, given that refusal to comply
with the immunity order on the basis of a person’s privilege
against self-incrimination is barred, but the quid pro quo is
that neither direct nor derivative testimony or other
information may be used against the witness in any criminal
case. In answering its own question, the Supreme Court held
Hal M. Koontz and Jeffrey C. Stodel, The Scope of Testimonial
Immunity under the Fifth Amendment: Kastigar v. United States, 6 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 350, 352 (1973).
129 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
130 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972).
128
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that the immunity is coextensive with the privilege and
suffices to supplant it.
The statute's explicit proscription of
the use in any criminal case of “testimony or
other information compelled under the order
(or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other
information)” is consonant with Fifth
Amendment standards. We hold that such
immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and therefore is
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of
the privilege. While a grant of immunity
must afford protection commensurate with
that afforded by the privilege, it need not be
broader. Transactional immunity, which
accords full immunity from prosecution for
the offense to which the compelled testimony
relates, affords the witness considerably
broader protection than does the Fifth
Amendment privilege. The privilege has
never been construed to mean that one who
invokes
it
cannot
subsequently
be
prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford
protection against being “forced to give
testimony leading to the infliction of
‘penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.’”
(Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S., at 438439, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.,
at 634.) Immunity from the use of compelled
testimony, as well as evidence derived
directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this
protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial
authorities from using the compelled
testimony in any respect, and it therefore
insures that the testimony cannot lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties on the
witness.131

131

Id. at 453.
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Thus, the majority in Kastigar held that the United
States need only grant use and derivative use immunity.
In Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm’n,132 which
the Supreme Court decided on the same day, the Court held
that the Kastigar decision was also applicable to state
immunity statutes. The Supreme Court found that the New
Jersey statutory immunity from use and derivative use (N.
J. Rev. Stat. 52:9M-17 (b) (1970)), which is written in
similar terms to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(d) and 18 U.S. Code §
6002, was coextensive with the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination and was sufficient to compel
testimony.
This is a comprehensive prohibition
on the use and derivative use of testimony
compelled under a grant of immunity.
Appellant
contends
that
only
full
transactional immunity affords protection
commensurate with that afforded by the
privilege and suffices to compel testimony
over a claim of the privilege. We rejected this
argument today in Kastigar, where we held
that immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege,
and is therefore sufficient to compel
testimony. We perceive no difference
between the degree of protection afforded by
the New Jersey statute and that afforded by
the federal statute sustained in Kastigar.133
As mentioned in Part II, the trial court in Cosby in
referring to transactional immunity appears to have
misunderstood Pennsylvania’s immunity statute which is
based on use and derivative use immunity rather than
transactional immunity. This misunderstanding may have
followed from D.A. Castor’s own confusion, as the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania observed.
The [trial] court deemed the former
district attorney’s characterization of his
132
133

406 U.S. 472 (1972).
Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm’n, 406 U.S. 472, 475 (1972).
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decision-making
and
intent
to
be
inconsistent, inasmuch as he testified at
times that he intended transactional
immunity, while asserting at other times
that he intended use and derivative-use
immunity.134
It is of course conceivable, given the district
attorney’s wide discretion under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(b), that
D.A. Castor could have crafted a request for an immunity
order that amounted to transactional immunity,
notwithstanding 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(d), but that is mere
speculation as D.A. Castor chose to rely on his press release
and appears to have never seriously intended to pursue an
immunity order for Cosby. Whether such a hypothetical
transactional immunity order would have withstood court
scrutiny is another matter, although it is open to argument
that prosecutors at the state level may offer a witness
either transactional immunity or use and derivative use
immunity. However, in light of Kastigar, it would appear
that the better view at state level is that transactional
immunity needs to be specified in the statute, as in Article
50 of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law.
S 50.10 Compulsion of evidence by
offer of immunity; definitions of terms.
The
following
definitions
are
applicable to this article:
1. “Immunity.” A person who has
been a witness in a legal proceeding, and who
cannot, except as otherwise provided in this
subdivision, be convicted of any offense or
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or
on account of any transaction, matter or
thing concerning which he gave evidence
therein, possesses “immunity” from any such
conviction, penalty or forfeiture. A person
who possesses such
immunity
may
nevertheless be convicted of perjury as a
result of having given false testimony in such
134

Cosby, 252 A.3d at 1117.
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legal proceeding, and may be convicted of or
adjudged in contempt as a result of having
contumaciously refused to give evidence
therein.
2.
“Legal proceeding” means a
proceeding in or before any court or grand
jury, or before any body, agency or person
authorized by law to conduct the same and to
administer the oath or to cause it to be
administered.
3. “Give evidence” means to testify
or produce physical evidence.
For present purposes, there is a telling observation
in Kastigar as to an immunity order not being dependent
on the integrity of the prosecuting authorities, who also
have the burden of showing their evidence is independent
and untainted.
A person accorded this immunity under
18 U.S.C. § 6002, and subsequently
prosecuted, is not dependent for the
preservation of his rights upon the integrity
and good faith of the prosecuting authorities.
As stated in Murphy:
“Once
a
defendant
demonstrates that he has testified,
under a state grant of immunity, to
matters related to the federal
prosecution, the federal authorities
have the burden of showing that their
evidence is not tainted by establishing
that they had an independent,
legitimate source for the disputed
evidence.” Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
This burden of proof, which we reaffirm
as appropriate, is not limited to a negation of
taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the
affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it
proposes to use is derived from a legitimate
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source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony.135

The United States Department of Justice’s website
specifically refers to Kastigar in its policy statement dealing
with authorization to prosecute after compulsion.
9-23.400 - AUTHORIZATION
PROSECUTE AFTER COMPULSION

TO

The request to prosecute should
indicate
the
circumstances
justifying
prosecution and the method by which the
government will be able to establish that the
evidence it will use against the witness will
meet the government's burden under Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).136
This same point as regards the burden of proof of
adducing evidence independent of the compelled testimony
was made in Part II, when it was said that in Cosby’s case
there would have been no issue had the prosecution solely
used the testimony of women other than Constand whom
Cosby had allegedly sexually abused, but that was not the
approach the prosecution adopted.
However, as has been observed, it is questionable
whether the prosecution really bears the burden of proof
referred to above in Kastigar v. United States.137
There is without question a possibility
of secret misuse of compelled testimony, since
there is no great difficulty in finding sources
“wholly independent” for a conclusion already
reached from the leads of compelled
testimony. 138 Once an independent source is
found, the burden will shift to the defendant
who then must prove that illicit use was made
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 (1972).
United States Department of Justice, supra note 127.
137 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
138 See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir.
1971) (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
135
136
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of the testimony, and that the prosecution
against him was the result of such illicit use.139
This was the essence of Mr. Justice Marshall’s dissent
in Kastigar v. United States.140
I do not see how it can suffice merely to
put the burden of proof on the government.
First, contrary to the Court’s assertion, the
Court’s rule does leave the witness “dependent
for the preservation of his rights upon the
integrity and good faith of the prosecuting
authorities.” Ante at 406 U.S. 460. For the
information relevant to the question of taint is
uniquely within the knowledge of the
prosecuting authorities … The good faith of
the prosecuting authorities is thus the sole
safeguard of the witness’ rights. Second, even
their good faith is not a sufficient safeguard.
For the paths of information through the
investigative bureaucracy may well be long
and winding, and even a prosecutor acting in
the best of faith cannot be certain that
somewhere in the depths of his investigative
apparatus, often including hundreds of
employees, there was not some prohibited use
of the compelled testimony. Cf. Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Court
today sets out a loose net to trap tainted
evidence and prevent its use against the
witness, but it accepts an intolerably great
risk that tainted evidence will, in fact, slip
through that net.141
This presents the drafter of an immunity statute with
a dilemma. On the one hand transactional immunity may be
Richard D. Bennett, Self-incrimination: Choosing a Constitutional
Immunity Standard - Kastigar v. United States, 32 MD. L. REV. 289, 300
(1972)
140 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
141 Id. at 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139
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too generous and offer the witness an ‘immunity bath’, while
on the other hand use and derivative use immunity may still
undermine the protection of the witness. Nevertheless, in
Cosby’s case, at least it can be said that under use and
derivative use immunity in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(d), the
prosecution would have been prevented from using Cosby’s
four depositions given in Constand’s civil case. This would
have required the prosecution to broaden the net of evidence,
even if, in Justice Marshall’s words some tainted evidence
had slipped through the net.
This begs the question: does use and derivative use
immunity in exchange for compelled testimony represent a
fair bargain for the witness, whose protection from becoming
the accused, depending on the good faith of the prosecuting
authorities and the labyrinthine bureaucracy, may be as
strong as the single hair from a horse’s tail in the Greek
anecdote of the Sword of Damocles?
One academic commentator has answered this
question in the negative, albeit in the federal context of 18
U.S. Code § 6002 which was designed to achieve effective law
enforcement against organized crime, identifying two
difficulties with the Supreme Court’s decision in Kastigar.
Initially,
it
is
apparent
that
uncertainties persist in the subsequent
prosecution of a witness immunized under a
grant of use/derivative use immunity. Second,
it is apparent that recognition of the
constitutional sufficiency of use/derivative use
immunity has emasculated the scope of
protection
previously
thought
to
be
constitutionally mandated by the fifth
amendment. A witness is still subject to
criminal prosecution, and his ability to avoid
compulsory testimony is drastically limited to
arguable and narrow situations.142
This leads Harding to conclude that ‘[a] witness may
find no incentive to talk where he can still be prosecuted and
may prefer the consequences of a contempt finding …
E. R. Harding, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony:
Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REV. 470, 495
(1974).
142
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[w]ithout the added incentive inherent in the removal of all
criminal sanctions, silence may indeed be golden.’ 143 In
effect, Harding’s argument is that unless transactional
immunity is available, use and derivative use immunity does
not represent a sufficiently fair bargain to give testimony
and a contempt finding may be the more preferable outcome.
So, by analogy, would a person in Cosby’s situation faced only
with use and derivative use immunity be better advised to
risk a contempt finding in civil proceedings?
The problem with such a strategy is that the penalty
for civil contempt, unlike criminal contempt,144 is potentially
open-ended, encapsulated in the oft quoted phrase ‘the
contemnor has the key to the cell in his own pocket.’ 145
Judges have justified such draconian punishment for civil
contempt on the basis that without the power to compel
compliance courts would be unable to function.146
A sobering reminder of the severity of penalties for
civil contempt can be found in the Pennsylvania case of
Beatty Chadwick, who was finally released in 2009 after
serving 14 years in jail which is the longest term ever
imposed thus far for civil contempt. Chadwick was jailed for
failing to deposit approximately $2.5 million into a courtcontrolled account which was designated for alimony
payments to his ex-wife. In Chadwick v Janecka, the United
States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, found
“that there is no federal constitutional bar to Mr. Chadwick’s
indefinite confinement for civil contempt so long as he
retains the ability to comply with the order requiring him to
pay over the money at issue.”147
Thus, had Cosby refused to comply with a court order
to make depositions in Constand’s civil case, then he would
have risked being jailed for contempt. The upshot would have
been threefold: (1) Cosby may have served an indeterminate
amount of time in jail until he purged himself of the
contempt; (2) he may have incurred the ire of the court and
thereby possibly increased the quantum of damages he
ultimately would have had to pay; and (3) he may still have
faced criminal charges even if he had previously secured a
Id.
See, 42 U.S. Code § 1995 (1957).
145 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
146 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).
147 Chadwick v Janecka, 302 F.3d 107, 120 (3rd Cir. Ct. App. 2002) .
143
144
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use and derivative use immunity order. In the words of Fagin
‘I think I’d better think it out again!’148

V. A DEFENDANT’S BEST COURSE OF ACTION
It is always wise with a course of action to consider
the likely consequences before going ahead with it.149
In summing up the best course of action for a
defendant in the position that Cosby found himself, it would
appear a reasonable conclusion that given the wide-ranging
discretion of district attorneys and their successors, it would
be unwise to rely on either press releases or promises short
of immunity guarantees disclaiming any intention to
prosecute in the future on the same facts and eschewing use
of dispositions in civil proceedings. As mentioned in Part IV,
a person in Cosby’s position needs greater certainty than
reliance on the doctrine of promissory estoppel or potential
offending against the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause, which was the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
remedy to Cosby’s reasonable reliance on D.A. Castor’s
promise. Reliance on the common law has always been
fraught with difficulty as courts regularly confine precedents
to their facts or distinguish the case in question on its facts
from decided precedents. In the absence of an immunity
order, a better strategy is to test the value of the promise
from the district attorney’s office by claiming the Fifth
Amendment right in the civil action until the court rules that
the District Attorney’s assurance of no prosecution is
absolute and binding on his or her successors. This would
stymie, or at least make more difficult, any attempt in the
future by the district attorney’s office to reopen the
possibility of a criminal prosecution.
The danger or the risk of reliance on the promise of
no prosecution is the one Cosby experienced with the
findings of the trial court, particularly (1) any agreement
between then D.A. Castor and Cosby was an incomplete and
unauthorized contemplation of transactional immunity; (2)
the Commonwealth was not estopped from prosecuting
RON MOODY, Reviewing the Situation, on OLIVER! THE ORIGINAL
SOUNDTRACK (Colgems 1968).
149 George Jackson.
148
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Cosby because there was no written documentation to
evidence that an offer not to prosecute had ever been
extended; and (3) immunity can be conferred only upon strict
compliance with Pennsylvania’s immunity statute. As
regards the latter, this is the position taken by the current
Montgomery County District Attorney, Kevin Steele, who as
mentioned in Part II, has petitioned the United States
Supreme Court seeking to reinstate Cosby’s sexual assault
conviction on the ground that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had given D.A. Castor’s press release the legal
weight of an immunity agreement.
Effectively, the trial court held (and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania did not address the validity of the trial
court’s finding) no statement or promise that D.A. Castor
could have made, no matter how definitive or in what format,
would substitute for an immunity order. In other words,
when D.A. Castor and Cosby’s attorneys were engaged in
negotiations as to the deal or bargain that was being struck
(no prosecution in exchange for depositions in Constand’s
civil case), nothing short of an immunity order would suffice.
Thus, on the authority of Cosby’s case, attorneys acting for a
person in Cosby’s position can now completely discount and
put aside any assurances from the relevant district
attorney’s office in the case in hand that are not backed by
an immunity order. The onus has shifted away from the
defendant’s acceptance or otherwise of the offer on the table
to the precondition of an immunity order before civil
testimony is forthcoming. This leaves the question of the type
of immunity order to be sought.
Before turning to the nature of any immunity order
being sought by a district attorney, it is worth reflecting on
the ramifications of the trial court’s finding in Cosby’s case.
In Part I, it was stated that plea bargaining is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system but rather personifies
the criminal justice system. Cosby made a deal with D.A.
Castor which was reneged on by his successors. Cosby was
only released after spending three years in jail because the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that D.A. Castor made
an unconditional promise of non-prosecution that Cosby
relied upon and which the principle of fundamental fairness
demanded be enforced.
Such an uncertain outcome is cold comfort to a person
contemplating the type of bargain Cosby was offered by D.A.
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Castor. No rational person would accept such a bargain,
given most state and local prosecutors are elected officials
who have a vested interest in the outcome of a case with the
additional uncertainty of a regular turnover of office holder,
which in turn undermines the reliability of the normal pleabargaining process. The Cosby case may well result in
district attorneys facing greater resistance to plea-bargains
unless they are backed by an immunity order. This will
certainly be the case if D.A. Steele’s petition currently before
the Supreme Court of the United States is ultimately
successful and results in Cosby being sent back to jail to
complete his original sentence.
As to the type of immunity order, in Part IV it was
argued that given the district attorney’s wide discretion
under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(b), D.A. Castor could have crafted
a request for an immunity order that amounted to
transactional immunity, notwithstanding 42 Pa.C.S. §
5947(d). Whether such a hypothetical transactional
immunity order would have withstood court scrutiny is
another matter, although it would appear that the better
view at state level is that transactional immunity needs to
be specified in the statute, as in Article 50 of New York’s
Criminal Procedure Law.
In the absence of transactional immunity being
specified in the statute, the pragmatic defendant should
assume (1) that use and derivative use immunity will
apply, and (2) even with such immunity the protection of
the witness may still be undermined depending on the good
faith of the prosecuting authorities and the subterranean
tentacles of the supporting investigative apparatus.
Nevertheless, at least it can be said that under use and
derivative use immunity, the prosecution is prevented from
using depositions given in a civil case. This requires the
prosecution to broaden the net of evidence even if some
tainted derivative evidence slips through the net.
Only one other option remains: to call the district
attorney’s bluff to reconsider a criminal prosecution should
the defendant have failed to co-operate in the civil case
without further assurances, bearing in mind the weaknesses
in the evidence against the defendant which led to the deal
being offered in the first place. Of course, the defendant does
not possess the luxury of hindsight in second guessing the
mind of the prosecutor, but there is much to be said for
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putting the district attorney’s office to the test as there may
be less obdurate defendants to pursue against whom there is
better evidence available. Why provide any further evidence
in a civil trial to the evidence already available to the
prosecutor when that additional evidence may strengthen
the prosecutor’s hand and stoke the fires of a future
prosecution. In the words of Shakespeare: “There is a tide in
the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to
fortune; omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in
shallows and in miseries.”150
The conclusion to be drawn from the forgoing analysis
is that a person in Cosby’s position, faced with a deal from
prosecuting authorities that no prosecution will be
forthcoming in exchange for depositions in a parallel civil
case on the same facts, should as a matter of rational
decision-making reject the deal if it is based on ‘paper’
assurances in the form of a press release or written
assurances. This follows because it is unclear whether a
district attorney can bind his or her successors in law.
The rational decision or least risky strategy is to call
the district attorney’s bluff and force the issue by rejecting
the deal unless it is backed by a transactional immunity
order or a use and derivative use immunity order, based on
the law as stated by the trial court in Cosby’s case. If the
district attorney refuses to seek an immunity order, then it
is the prosecuting authorities who are put to the test. The
weaker the evidence available to the district attorney’s office,
which is presumably why a deal was offered in the first place,
then the less likely the prosecution will elect to go to trial,
especially against a well-resourced defendant.
If the district attorney instead elects to seek an
immunity order, the rational defendant should first seek a
transactional immunity order and in the alternative a use
and derivative use immunity order, which will depend on (a)
the language of the statute itself, and (b) the interpretation
given to the statute by the courts of the respective
jurisdiction. True it is that a use and derivative use
immunity order does not offer complete protection to a
witness for the reasons discussed in Part IV, but such an
immunity order is far better than relying on promises that
THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Act-IV, SceneIII.
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do not bind a district attorney’s successors. Ultimately, this
is the most rational strategy for a person in Cosby’s position
aiming to minimize the risk of providing evidence to the
district attorney’s office that might prompt a future
prosecution.

